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Davis: In re Seagate Technology, LLC 497 F.3D 1360 (FED. CIR. 2007)

IN RE SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY, LLC
497 F.3D 1360 (FED. CIR. 2007)

I. INTRODUCTION

In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, Seagate petitioned for a writ
of mandamus directing the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to vacate its orders compelling
disclosure of materials and testimony related to Seagate's trial
preparation, which Seagate claimed was protected by attorneyclient privilege and work product protection.' The district court
ruled that Seagate waived any attorney-client privilege, including
any privilege between Seagate and its independent trial counsel,
when it invoked the reliance on counsel defense to willful patent
infringement.2 The United States Court of Appeals, Federal
Circuit, granted Seagate's writ and held that the scope of waiver of
attorney-client privilege and work product protection that results
from an asserted advice of counsel defense to a charge of willful
infringement does not extend to the communications or work
product of trial counsel.3
II. BACKGROUND

Convolve, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(collectively "Convolve") brought suit against Seagate alleging
willful infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 4,916,635 ('635) and
5,638,267 ('267), and infringement of Patent No. 6,314,473
('473).4

1. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

2. Id. at 1366.
3. Id. at 1374, 1376.
4. Id. at 1366.
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Prior to the lawsuit, Seagate retained Gerald Sekimura to
evaluate Convolve's patents and prepare written opinions on
them.' The first of three opinions was received on July 24, 2000,
and analyzed the '635 and '267 patents as well as Convolve's
pending International Application WO 99/45535, which claimed
technology similar to the pending '473 patent.6 The opinion
concluded that many claims were invalid and that Seagate's
products did not infringe.7 On December 29, 2000, Sekimura
provided an updated opinion in which he concluded that the '267
patent was possibly unenforceable. 8 Both opinions noted that not
all claims had been reviewed and that further analysis should be
performed regarding the '535 application, preferably after the
patent issued.9 On February 21, 2003, Seagate received the third
opinion, which concerned the validity and infringement of the
issued '473 patent. 10 It was undisputed that Seagate's opinion
counsel operated independently of its trial counsel at all times."1
In early 2003, Seagate notified Convolve of its intent to rely on
Sekimura's three opinion letters as a defense to the alleged willful
infringement, and it disclosed Sekimura's work product and made
him available for deposition. 2
Convolve moved to compel
discovery of any communications and work product of Seagate's
trial counsel, and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that Seagate waived the attorney-client
privilege for all communications between it and any counsel,
including its trial and in-house counsel, concerning the subject
matter of Sekimura's opinions. 3 Further, the district court held
that the waiver began when Seagate first gained knowledge of the
patents and would last until the alleged infringement ceased. 4 The
district court ordered the production of any requested documents
and testimony concerning the subject matter of Sekimura's
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1366.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1366.

14. Id. at 1366-67.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/8
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opinions. 15 The district court provided for in camera review of
documents relating to trial strategy, but allowed disclosure of any
document which would undermine the reasonableness of relying
on Sekimura's opinions.' 6 The district court also determined that
Seagate had waived the protection of any work product which had
been communicated to it. 17

Convolve sought production of trial counsel opinions relating to
infringement, invalidity, and enforceability of the patents, and also
noticed depositions of Seagate's trial counsel.'" The district court
denied Seagate's motion for a stay and certification of an
interlocutory appeal, after which Seagate petitioned for a writ of
mandamus. 9 The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit,
stayed the discovery orders and ordered en banc review of the
following questions:
(1) Should a party's assertion of the advice of
counsel defense to willful infringement extend
waiver of the attorney-client privilege to
communications with that party's trial counsel?
(2) What is the effect of any such waver on work
product immunity?
(3) Given the impact of the statutory duty of care
standard announced in Underwater Devices, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. on the issue of waiver of
attorney-client privilege, should [the] court
Devices and
reconsider the decision in Underwater
20
the duty of care standard itself?

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Federal Circuit first evaluated whether mandamus relief was
warranted in this case, and held that the standard set forth in In re

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1367.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367.
20. Id.; see also In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
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Regents of the University of California had been satisfied.' The
court then discussed the role of "willfulness" in patent law and
overruled the standard and the corresponding duty to obtain an
opinion of counsel set forth in Underwater Devices.22 Next, the
court considered the scope of the attorney-client privilege and
work product waiver associated with an advice of counsel
defense. 3 The court held that the advice of counsel waiver of
attorney-client privilege did not extend to trial counsel or to trial
counsel work product, absent exceptional circumstances.24
A. Mandamus
The Federal Circuit began its review by determining if the case
met the standard for mandamus relief. 5 The court noted that,
generally, "[a] party seeking a writ of mandamus bears the burden
of proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief desired,
and that the right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and
indisputable."' 26 The court explained further by stating the
following:
[M]andamus review may be granted of discovery
orders that turn on claims of privilege when (1)
there is raised an important issue of first
impression, (2) the privilege would be lost if review
were denied until final judgment, and (3) immediate
resolution would avoid the development of doctrine
that would undermine the privilege. 7

21. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367; see also In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the three elements which must be
satisfied for mandamus review to be granted).
22. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
23. Id. at 1370, 1372.
24. Id. at 1374, 1376.
25. Id. at 1367.
26. Id. (citing Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S.
296, 309 (1989)).
27. Id. (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1388 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/8
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The court held that this case met these criteria.28
The court reviewed the trial court's determination of the scope
the
of waiver under an abuse of discretion standard and applied
29
law of the Federal Circuit to all substantive patent law issues.
B. PatentInfringement and Enhanced Damages
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the history
and precedent relating to patent infringement and the willfulness
requirement for enhanced damages.3" The court noted that patent
infringement is a strict liability offense and thus, the nature of the
offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages
While the current statute does not contain a
are warranted.'
standard for awarding enhanced damages, the Supreme Court has
held that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of
willful infringement.3 2 However, "a finding of willfulness does
33
not require an award of enhanced damages; it merely permits it."
The Federal Circuit next reviewed the standard for evaluating
willful infringement created in Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., where the court held the following:
Where ...a potential infringer has actual notice of

another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is
infringing. Such an affirmative duty includes, inter
alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal
advice from counsel before the initiation of any
34
possible infringing activity.
The court noted that, over time, willfulness and its associated
duty of care have come to be evaluated under a totality of the
28. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367
29. Id. at 1367-68.
at 1368.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Id.
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).
33. Id.
34. Seagate,497 F.3d at 1368-69 (alteration in original) (quoting Underwater
Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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35
circumstances test.

Next, the court reviewed the advice of counsel defense
commonly asserted by accused willful infringers.36 Under this
defense, the alleged willful infringer attempts to establish that its
continued allegedly infringing activities were performed in good
faith under reasonable reliance on advice from counsel that the
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.37 The court
noted that an accused infringer's reliance on favorable advice of
counsel, or his failure to show any favorable advice, is not
dispositive of the willfulness issue, but is nevertheless crucial to
the court's analysis. 8
The court recognized some of the concerns related to the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine which arose
after Underwater Devices.39 Specifically, the court echoed its
observations from Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp:
[A]n accused infringer "should not... be forced to
choose between waiving the [attorney-client]
privilege in order to protect itself from a willfulness
finding, in which case it may risk prejudicing itself
on the question of liability, and maintaining the
privilege, in which case it may risk being found to
be a willful infringer if liability is found."4
The court reviewed its decision in Knorr-Bremse, where the
court held that invoking the attorney-client privilege, work product
protection, or an infringer's failure to obtain legal advice does not
give rise to an adverse inference with respect to willfulness.4
Such an "inference imposed 'inappropriate burdens on the
attorney-client relationship."' 4 2
35. Id. at 1369.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940
F.2d 642, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
41. Id. at 1369-70; see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
42. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/8
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The court reviewed its decision in EchoStar, where the court
held that "relying on in-house counsel's advice to refute a charge
of willfulness triggers waiver of the attorney-client privilege", and
that "asserting the advice of counsel defense waives work product
protection and the attorney-client privilege for all communications
on the same subject matter, as well as any documents
memorializing attorney-client communications."43
The court
narrowed the scope of the rule by holding that "waiver did not
extend to work product that was not communicated to an accused
infringer.""
1. Willful Infringement
In discussing willfulness in patent law, the court noted that
willfulness has a well established meaning in civil law which was
recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Co.
of America v. Burr.5 In Safeco, the Court concluded that willful's
"standard civil usage" included reckless behavior.46
The Federal Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's
definition of willfulness from the duty of care concerning willful
infringement and held that "proof of willful infringement
permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of
objective recklessness."47 The court also found that since the
affirmative duty of care in Underwater Devices had been
abandoned, the affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel
had likewise been eliminated.48
The Federal Circuit proceeded to define recklessness and to lay
out a new two-part test for willful infringement. 49 First, the court
held that to establish willful infringement "a patentee must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite
an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
43. Id. (citing In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299, 1302-

03).
44. Id. (citing EchoStar,448 F.3d at 1303-04).
45. Id. at 1370 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 2209
(2007)).
46. Id. at 1370-71 (quoting Safeco, 127 S.Ct. at 2209).
47. Id. at 1371.
48. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
49. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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infringement of a valid patent. The state of mind of the accused
infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry. 5 ° Second, the
"patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk
(determined by the record developed in the infringement
proceeding) was either known or so 5obvious that it should have
been known to the accused infringer." 1
Next, the court rejected Convolve's argument that the court's
review of the willfulness doctrine was improper as hypothetical or
advisory.2
2. Attorney-Client Privilege
The Federal Circuit next reviewed the scope of attorney-client
privilege waiver associated with the advice-of-counsel defense to a
charge of willful infringement.53 The court acknowledged that the
attorney-client privilege is intended "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients" and that this
privilege recognizes "that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends . ..""
The court reviewed the law concerning attorney-client privilege
and stated that "[t]he attorney-client privilege belongs to the client,
who alone may waive it."55 The court remarked that, in order to
determine what subject matter falls within the scope of a waiver,
courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, nature of the
legal advice, and any prejudices which may result from permitting
or prohibiting further disclosure. 5 6 Next, the court evaluated the
differences between trial counsel and opinion counsel. The court
found that opinion counsel serves to provide an objective
assessment for making informed business decisions, and trial
counsel focuses on litigation strategies in an adversarial

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1372.
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449

U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349-50
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/8
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proceeding."
The court reasoned that the trial counsel attorney-client privilege
in patent litigation raised the same concerns as those identified by
the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, in that allowing
discovery of counsel's thoughts would result in inefficiency and
sharp practices.58
The court reasoned that extending waiver to trial counsel was
inconsistent with the fact that, in ordinary circumstances, willful
infringement will depend on an infringer's prelitigation conduct.59
The court noted that since a patentee must have a good faith basis
for alleging willful infringement when a complaint is filed,
willfulness claims must be grounded exclusively in the accused
infringer's pre-filing conduct.6" The court also recognized that if
the accused's post-complaint conduct is reckless, then the patentee
The court
can seek a preliminary injunction as a remedy."
reasoned that a patentee who does not attempt to stop an accused
infringer's post-filing activities by moving for a preliminary
injunction should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages
based on the infringer's post-filing conduct.62
Thus, the court reasoned that because willful infringement must
find its basis in pre-litigation conduct, the communications of trial
counsel have little relevance warranting their disclosure.63 This
supports generally shielding trial counsel from the waiver
stemming from an advice of counsel defense to willfulness. 4 The
court noted that in this case, the opinions of Seagate's opinion
counsel were received after the suit was commenced, and while the
reasoning in those opinions may preclude a finding of recklessness
if infringement is found, reliance on the opinions after litigation
was commenced will likely be of little significance.6
The court summarized its new general rule that "asserting the
advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of opinion
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1373.
Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
Id. at 1374.
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for
communications with trial counsel. ' 66 The court qualified the rule
by stating that it is not absolute and that "courts remain free to
exercise their discretion in unique circumstances to extend waiver
to trial counsel, such as if a party or counsel engages in
chicanery."67
3. Work ProductProtection
Next, the Federal Circuit addressed whether the waiver made in
an advice of counsel defense extends to trial counsel's work
product. 6' The court stated the goal of the work product doctrine
as balancing the dual needs of the adversary system by providing
immunity to promote an attorney's preparation against society's
interest in revealing all true material facts of a dispute.69 The court
noted that attorney work product receives qualified, rather than
absolute, immunity, and it can be overcome by need or undue
The level of hardship required to overcome the
hardship.70
immunity varies, such that factual work product can be discovered
by showing substantial need or undue hardship, while "mental
processes work product is afforded even greater, nearly absolute,
protection."'"
The court recognized that work product protection, like the
attorney-client privilege, can be waived.7 2 The rationale for
limiting waiver of the attomey-client privilege with trial counsel is
even stronger for work product because of the nature of the work
product doctrine, which strengthens the adversary process by
preserving the fairness and efficiency of the system and would be
damaged if adversaries were entitled to probe each other's
thoughts and plans concerning a case. 73
66. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
67. Id. at 1374-75.
68. Id. at 1375.
69. Id. at 1375 (quoting In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
70. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
71. Id.
72. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1375 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,
239 (1975)).
73. See id. (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/8
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The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Nobles as approving of the restriction of the scope of work product
waiver because the Supreme Court refused to allow a "fishing
expedition" into all defense files when the defense investigator
waived work product protection to reports related to his testimony
by affirmatively testifying.7 4 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
limiting waiver to Seagate's opinion counsel was consistent with
Noble because Convolve had been granted access to the materials
relating to Seagate's opinion counsel's opinion, and the opinion
counsel had been made available for deposition."
The Federal Circuit held as a general rule that "relying on
opinion counsel's work product does not waive work product
immunity with respect to trial counsel." 6 Again, the court
qualified the rule by allowing extension of the waiver to trial
counsel in cases of chicanery and reiterated that work product
discovery would still be available upon a showing of need or
undue hardship.77
Finally, the court held that nontangible work product does
receive protection under Hickman, despite Rule 26(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which explicitly provides work
product protection to "documents and tangible things," and granted
Seagate's petition for a writ of mandamus for the above reasons."
C. ConcurringOpinions

1. Judge Gajarsa'sConcurringOpinion, Joined by Judge Newman
Judge Gajarsa wrote separately because he would eliminate the
willfulness requirement from 35 U.S.C. § 284 altogether.79
Gajarsa believed that the court should adhere to the plain meaning
of the statute and leave the discretion to enhance damages in the
864 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
74. Id. at 1376 (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239-40).

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
79. See id. at 1376-77 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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hands of the district courts.8"
2. Judge Newman's ConcurringOpinion
Judge Newman wrote separately to clarify his reasons for
overruling Underwater Devices."
Newman agreed with the
court's decision to overrule Underwater Devices because it has
been misapplied to "require more than the reasonable care that a
responsible enterprise gives to the property of others."82 Newman
reasoned that rather than the per se rule of Underwater Devicesthat every possibly related patent must be studied by legal counsel
to avoid presumptively incurring treble damage-the standard for
evaluating adverse patents should be the standards of fair
commerce, including reasonableness of the actions taken in the
particular circumstances.83 Such a standard would not disregard
the intentional destruction of the value of property of another,
which Newman reasoned a "recklessness" standard failed to do.84
IV. CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit overruled Underwater Devices, reasoning
that its negligence standard was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's definition of "willful" as recklessness.85 By aligning the
standard of "willfulness" with recklessness, the court removed the
affirmative duty of care and its corresponding obligation to obtain
opinion of counsel.86 The court held that, in general, asserting the
advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of opinion
counsel or relying on opinion counsel work product does not
constitute waiver of attorney-client privilege for communications
or work product of trial counsel.87 The court reasoned that the rule
is not absolute, and district courts can exercise discretion in

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
See id. at 1384-85 (Newman, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1385
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1385.
Id. at 1371 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1374, 1376.
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extending waiver to trial counsel in unique circumstances.8 8
Kyle Davis

88. Id. at 1374-76.
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